Plaintiff-Appellant\u27s Opening Replacement Brief by Malhotra, Anjana et al.
Seattle University School of Law 
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality Centers, Programs, and Events 
5-4-2012 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Replacement Brief 
Anjana Malhotra 
Robert Chang 
Ronald A. Peterson Law Clinic 
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/korematsu_center 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Malhotra, Anjana; Chang, Robert; Ronald A. Peterson Law Clinic; and Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equality, "Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Replacement Brief" (2012). Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equality. 59. 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/korematsu_center/59 
This Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers, Programs, and Events at Seattle University 
School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and 
Equality by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, 
please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
 
No. 10-35917  
IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




ROBIN WILLIAMS, et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington at Tacoma 
No. CV-09-05630-RJB 




Anjana Malhotra  
Robert Chang*  
William Witherspoon, certified law student 
RONALD PETERSON LAW CLINIC 
Civil Rights Amicus Clinic 
Seattle University School of Law 
1215 E. Columbia Street 
Seattle, WA 98122-4340 
Telephone: 206.398.4130 
Facsimile: 206.398.4136 
Court-Appointed Pro Bono Counsel for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
 
* pending admission to this Court 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 1 of 78
(1 of 166)
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 Seattle University School of Law is a not-for-profit educational institution 
operating under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It has no parent 
corporation, nor any stock, thus no publicly held company holds 10% or more of 
its stock.
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 2 of 78
(2 of 166)




 -i-  
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ..................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 15 
STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................... 17 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 17 
I. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Mr. 
Hoisington’s Claims that Defendants Imposed Unconstitutional 
Conditions of Confinement, Violating His Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Rights ....................................................................................... 17 
A. Conditions of Confinement Are Appropriately Tested Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment ...................................................................... 17 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment and 
Dismissing the Case Without Addressing All of Mr. 
Hoisington’s Fourteenth Amendment Claims .................................... 20 
C. Defendants’ Policies Mandating Strip and Visual Body Cavity 
Searches, Full Restraints, and Other Treatment Incident to Off-
Island Transport Create Unconstitutional Conditions of 
Confinement, Violating Mr. Hoisington’s Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Rights ........................................................ 22 
1. The Policies Mandating Strip and Visual Body Cavity 
Searches and Full Restraints Are Not Reasonably Related 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 3 of 78
(3 of 166)




 -ii-  
 
to Legitimate Civil Commitment Objectives in Light of 
Readily Available Alternatives and Instead Reflect an 
Exaggerated Response to the State’s Security Concerns ......... 24 
2. The Adoption of Policies Mandating Strip and Visual 
Body Cavity Searches Is Punitive and Violates the 
Youngberg Professional-Judgment Standard ........................... 28 
II. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Mr. 
Hoisington’s Claim that the Blanket Strip and Visual Body Cavity 
Policy Violated His Fourth Amendment Rights ........................................... 32 
A. The Fourth Amendment Requires Individualized Suspicion 
Before a Civilly Committed Resident May Be Subjected to a 
Strip and Visual Body Cavity Search ................................................. 33 
1. Persons Held in Civil Custody Are Not Subject to 
Punishment ............................................................................... 33 
2. Different Constitutional Standards Apply to Persons Held 
in Civil Custody than Apply to Prisoners Charged or 
Convicted of a Crime ............................................................... 34 
3. Visual Body Cavity Searches of Persons in Custody 
Under a Civil Commitment Requires Individualized 
Suspicion .................................................................................. 38 
4. The District Court Erred Because Mr. Hoisington Was 
Strip Searched Without Any Evidence of Reasonable 
Suspicion .................................................................................. 47 
B. Even if Individualized Suspicion Is Not Required to Justify a 
Visual Body Cavity Search of a Civilly Committed Resident, 
There are Genuine Issues of Material Fact Whether the Search 
Was Reasonable ................................................................................. 49 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 4 of 78
(4 of 166)




 -iii-  
 
1. Legal Standard For Assessing Reasonableness of Strip 
Search Policy Requires Balancing Restriction of 
Hoisington’s Constitutional Rights With Valid Civil 
Commitment Interest ............................................................... 50 
2. The District Court Erred By Failing to Engage in a 
Factually Complete or Reasoned Analysis of the 
Invasiveness of the Strip Search or the Availability of 
Less Intrusive Alternatives in Evaluating Hoisington’s 
Strip Search Under the Fourth Amendment ............................ 51 
3. Defendants Did Not Carry Their Burden of Establishing 
the Absence of a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Whether 
There Were Less Intrusive Alternatives to Visual Body 
Cavity Searches that Would Have a De Minimis Impact 
on Security Concerns ............................................................... 54 
III. On Remand, Appellant Is Entitled to Proceed on His Fourteenth and 
Fourth Amendment Claims to Seek Prospective Relief and Monetary 
Damages to Remedy these Constitutional Violations .................................. 57 
A. The Eleventh Amendment Does Not Bar Prospective Relief ............ 57 
B. On Remand, Mr. Hoisington Is Entitled to Pursue His Claims 
for Monetary Damages Because His Rights Were Clearly 
Established at the Time of the Violation ............................................ 59 
IV. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 59 
 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 5 of 78
(5 of 166)




 -iv-  
CASES 
Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley,  
 971 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1992) ......................................................................... 30 
 
Adnan v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Corrections, 
 No. 4:02–CV–03451, 2002 WL 32058464 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ....................... 42 
 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
 477 U.S. 242 (1986)....................................................................................... 17 
 
Bacon v. Kolender,  
 Civ. No. 05-0310, 2007 WL 2669541 (S.D. Cal.2007) ................................ 36 
 
Bell v. Wolfish,  
 441 U.S. 520 (1979)................................................................................passim 
 
Blankenhorn v. City of Orange,  
 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 17 
 
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) ............................................................... 26 
 
Bull v. City and County of San Francisco,  
 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) ..................................................................passim 
 
Buono v. Norton,  
 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 17 
 
Chandler v. Miller,  
 520 U.S. 305 (1997)....................................................................................... 39 
 
Chapman v. Nichols,  
 989 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993) ....................................................................... 52 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 6 of 78
(6 of 166)




 -v-  
 
 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,  
 531 U.S. 32 (2000)......................................................................................... 40 
 
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Secondary Education Expense Bd.,  
 527 U.S. 666 (1999)....................................................................................... 57 
 
Dudgeon v. Cunningham, No. C10-5372 TRL/KLS, 2011 WL 4001099, 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2011). ........................................................................ 32 
 
Ex parte Young,  
 209 U.S. 123 (1908)....................................................................................... 58 
 
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington,  
 No. 10-945, 2012 WL 1069092 (2012) ..................................................passim 
 
Flores v. Fresno County Bd. of Sup'rs,  
 2009 WL 179775 (E.D. Cal. 2009) ............................................................... 41 
 
Flores v. Meese,  
 681 F. Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. 1988) ................................................................ 42 
 
Florida v. Rodriguez,  
 469 U.S. 1 (1984) ..................................................................................... 40, 57 
 
Franklin v. Murphy,  
 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................................. 20, 22 
 
Frost v. Symington,  
 197 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1999) ..................................................................passim 
 
 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 7 of 78
(7 of 166)




 -vi-  
 
Gary H. v. Hegstrom,  
 831 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1987) ....................................................................... 19 
 
Giles v. Ackerman,  
 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................................... 24, 52 
 
Gomez-Lopez v. Ashcroft,  
 393 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2005) ......................................................................... 37 
 
Haines v. Kerner,  
 404 U.S. 519 (1972)....................................................................................... 22 
 
Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina,  
 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................................. 24, 52 
 
Huguez v. U.S.,  
 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1969) ......................................................................... 42 
 
Hydrick v. Hunter,  
 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................... 36, 38 
 
In re Detention of Campbell,  
 986 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1999) ........................................................................... 19 
 
In re Detention of Turay,  
 986 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1999) ........................................................................... 19 
 
In re Detention of Young,  
 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) ..................................................................... 18, 19 
 
In re the Detention of Herzog,  
 No. 00-2-15307-4 SEA (King County Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2001)   ................ 9 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 8 of 78
(8 of 166)




 -vii-  
 
 
Johnson v. California,  
 543 U.S. 499 (2005)....................................................................................... 25 
 
Jones v. Blanas,  
 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004) ..................................................................passim 
 
Jordan v. Gardner,  
 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) ....................................................................... 39 
 
Kansas v. Hendricks,  
 521 U.S. 346 (1997)................................................................................. 18, 34 
 
Katz v. U.S.,  
 389 U.S. 347 (1967)................................................................................. 39, 59 
 
Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,  
 901 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................................... 29, 54 
 
Kirkpatrick v. City of Los Angeles,  
 803 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1986) ......................................................................... 42 
 
Martinez v. County of San Diego,  
 962 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1992) ........................................................................... 43 
 
Mary Beth G. v. Chicago,  
 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1984) ................................................................. 43, 52 
 
May v. Baldwin,  
 109 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1997) ......................................................................... 26 
 
 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 9 of 78
(9 of 166)




 -viii-  
 
Meyers v. Pope,  
 303 Fed. Appx. 513 (9th Cir.2008) ............................................................... 41 
 
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis,  
 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002) ......................................................................... 59 
 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,  
 469 U.S. 325 (1985)....................................................................................... 47 
 
Noonkester v. Tehama Cty. Sheriff,  
 2011 WL 2946360 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ............................................................. 30 
 
Overton v. Bazzetta,  
 539 U.S. 126 (2003)....................................................................................... 25 
 
Quern v. Jordan,  
 440 U.S. 332 (1979)....................................................................................... 57 
 
Refai v. Lazaro,  
 614 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Nev. 2009) ........................................................... 41 
 
Rivas v. United States,  
 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966) ......................................................................... 43 
 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,  
 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) ....................................................................... 39, 40, 52 
 
Saucier v. Katz,  
 533 U.S. 194 (2001)....................................................................................... 52 
 
Schmerber v. California,  
 384 U.S. 757 (1966)................................................................................. 39, 52 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 10 of 78
(10 of 166)








Seling v. Young,  
 531 U.S. 250 (2001)................................................................................. 18, 34 
 
Sharp v. Weston,  
 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) ................................................................passim 
 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n,  
 489 U.S. 602 (1989)................................................................................. 40, 47 
 
Sluimer v. Verity, Inc.,  
 606 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................................... 17, 54 
 
State v. Hoisington,  
 123 Wash. App. 138, (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 3 2001) ....................................... 3 
 
Sumahit v. Parker,  
 2009 WL 2879903 (E.D. Cal.) ...................................................................... 30 
 
Terry v. Ohio,  
 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ........................................................................................... 39 
 
Thompson v. City of Los Angeles,  
 885 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................................. 24, 31 
 
Thornburgh v. Abbott,  
 490 U.S. 401 (1989)....................................................................................... 26 
 
Tungwarara v. United States,  
 400 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ......................................................... 41 
 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 11 of 78
(11 of 166)




 -x-  
 
Turay v. Richards,  
 No. C91-0664RSM, 2007 WL 983132 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2007) ...passim 
 
Turner v. Safley,  
 482 U.S. 78 (1987)..................................................................................passim 
 
U.S. v. Gonzalez-Rincon,  
 36 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) ........................................................................... 42 
 
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md.,  
 535 U.S. 635 (2002)....................................................................................... 58 
 
Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart,  
 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011) ................................................................................... 58 
 
Walker v. Sumner,  
 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990) ......................................................................... 30 
 
Way v. County of Ventura,  
 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) ........................................................... 24, 44, 52 
 
Whitley v. Albers,  
 475 U.S. 312 (1986)....................................................................................... 23 
 
Winston v. Lee,  
 470 U.S. 753 (1985)....................................................................................... 39 
 
Wong v. Beebe (Wong II), 
 No. 01-718-ST, 2007 WL 1170621 (D. Or. Apr. 10, 2007).......................... 42 
 
Youngberg v. Romeo,  
 457 U.S. 307 (1982)................................................................................passim 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 12 of 78
(12 of 166)








28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................................ 1 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 ...................................................................................... 1 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ....................................................................................... 1,12, 15, 57 
42 U.S.C. § 1997 ..................................................................................................2, 18 
RCW 9.94A.030 ......................................................................................................... 7 
RCW 10.79.060 ....................................................................................................6, 28 
RCW 71.09 ................................................................................................................. 3 
RCW 71.09.010 ........................................................................................................34 
RCW 71.09.060 .......................................................................................................... 3 
RCW 71.09.080(3) ...............................................................................................3, 34 
RCW 71.09.200 .......................................................................................................... 3 
RCW 71.09.210 .......................................................................................................... 6 
WAC 388-880-110 ...............................................................................................9, 10 
 
RULES 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A)1 ...................................................................................... 1 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)................................................................................................ 54 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 13 of 78
(13 of 166)
 
 -1-  
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review the 
decision below pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court had subject-
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on September 23, 2010. 
Excerpt of Record (“ER”) 2. Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal pursuant 
to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) on October 7, 2010. ER 23–27. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 
section 1983 claim challenging Defendants’ blanket policy mandating strip 
searches, visual body cavity searches, and heavy restraints before and during 
transportation off-island, where such treatment violates Plaintiff’s due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. Whether Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 
section 1983 claim for Defendants’ blanket policy mandating strip searches and 
visual body cavity searches before and after off-island transportation where such 
treatment violates Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.  
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 26, 2009, the Plaintiff Monte Hoisington (“Hoisington”) filed a 
pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 and 42 U.S.C § 1997 et 
seq., stating that Defendants’ ongoing blanket policy mandating strip searches, 
visual body cavity searches, heavy restraints, and other harsh treatment incident to 
transportation off-island for medical treatment violates his constitutional rights 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Hoisington 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and reasonable 
attorney’s fees. He also demanded a jury trial. 
On April 27, 2010, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. ER 
185. Magistrate Karen Strombom recommended that summary judgment be 
granted. ER 3. Hoisington filed objections to the Magistrate’s Report and 
Recommendation. ER 31. On Sept. 23, 2010, the district court adopted the 
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, granted summary judgment for 
defendants, and dismissed the case. ER 2. 
Hoisington timely filed a Notice of Appeal. ER 23. Appearing pro se, he 
filed Appellant’s Informal Opening Brief on January 5, 2011. The defendants filed 
their Answering Brief on February 28, 2011. Upon review of the record, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that appointment of pro bono counsel in this 
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appeal would benefit this Court’s review. Accordingly, this Court appointed pro 
bono counsel on February 15, 2012, set the briefing schedule, and noted that oral 
argument would be scheduled during the month of October 2012. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Washington state’s Special Commitment Center (“SCC”) is located on 
McNeil Island and is operated by the state’s Department of Social and Health 
Services (“DSHS”). The SCC is designed to provide indeterminate confinement 
and care for certain individuals who have completed their incarceration sentences. 
ER 3. After completing a ten-year prison sentence, Hoisington was civilly 
committed on July 25, 2001, to the SCC under Washington’s sexually violent 
predator statute, RCW 71.09. State v. Hoisington, 123 Wash. App. 138, 141, 144, 
(Wash. Ct. App. Div. 3); ER 136. The SCC has held Hoisington in civil custody 
for approximately eleven years. ER 136.  
Those committed to the SCC are labeled “residents,” and their commitment 
is civil in nature. See RCW 71.09.200; RCW 71.09.060. Though confined, 
residents are not prisoners and confinement is not intended to punish or create a 
punitive environment.
1
 Additionally, residents have a statutory “right to adequate 
care and individualized treatment.” RCW 71.09.080(3). 
                                           
1
 See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000).  
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A. Previous SCC Constitutional Violations to Provide Adequate Care 
and Non-punitive Confinement Conditions 
 
Despite the requirements that care must be adequate and conditions of 
confinement must be non-punitive, the SCC’s treatment of its residents has been 
the subject of many years of contentious litigation. See Turay v. Richards, No. 
C91-0664RSM, 2007 WL 983132, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2007). Following a 
trial in 1994, the jury found that the SCC was not providing to its residents 
constitutionally adequate mental health treatment. Id. Later that year, the district 
court ordered “the SCC to bring the treatment program into compliance with 
constitutional requirements.” Id. Subsequently, another group of SCC residents 
sued the SCC over the conditions of confinement. Id. This action was combined 
with the Turay case. Id. 
 In October 1998, an evidentiary hearing was conducted. In November 1998, 
the district court found that the SCC had failed to meet its constitutional 
requirements and issued an order that included the elimination of routine strip 
searches of SCC residents following every contact visit. Id.
2
 At this hearing, “[t]he 
                                           
2
 The 1998 order required the following:  
 
additional staff training at the SCC; provision of a coherent and 
individualized treatment program for each resident; adequate provision for 
participation by the residents' families in rehabilitation efforts; construction 
of a separate treatment-oriented facility; elimination of the routine strip 
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SCC director testified that he found the routine strip searching to be an 
‘abomination.’” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2000). 
In November 1999, the district court found the SCC to be in contempt. Id. at 
*2. This Court upheld the 1998 remedial order. Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 
1172 (9th Cir. 2000). Instead of making treatment-directed decisions made by the 
professional directors of the SCC, Washington state Department of Corrections 
(“DOC”) policies were adopted, often without requesting different treatment of 
SCC residents. Id. at 1172 n.3. 
 The sanctions remained in force until the contempt order was purged in June 
2004 following SCC efforts to come into compliance. Turay, 2007 WL 983132, at 
*2. In 2007, the district court dissolved the injunction. Id. at *5. In doing so, the 
court noted: “This case has been troublesome to the Court in that there seems to be 
no right answer, and no good fix for the situation these plaintiffs face at the SCC.” 
Id. 
B. Defendants Subject SCC Residents to the Same Strip Search and 
                                                                                                                                        
searches of SCC residents following every visit; elimination of the 
monitoring of residents' telephone calls and the bar on outgoing calls; 
negotiation with McNeil Island Correction Center (“MICC”) management to 
obtain better meal and activity schedules; improvement to the treatment 
environment; and the initiation and implementation of program oversight 
both by an internal review process and by an external body. 
 
Turay, 2007 WL 983132, at *1. 
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Restraint Techniques Prescribed for Convicted Prisoners on SCC 
Residents When They Are Escorted Off-Island. 
 
Defendant Robin Williams is the former Secretary of DSHS; defendant 
Susan N. Dreyfus is the current Secretary of DSHS; defendant Kelly Cunningham 
is the current Superintendent of SCC;
3
 defendant Ronald Van Boening was the 
superintendent of the McNeil Island Correctional Center when the complaint was 
filed. ER 247-250. Defendants were or are responsible for developing and 
implementing the policies mandating strip and visual body cavity searches, full 
restraints, as well as other policies setting forth conditions incident to off-island 
transport. Id. The SCC and DOC are not restricted by a Washington state statute 
which forbids strip and cavity searches of pretrial detainees booked into holding, 
detention, or local correctional facilities absent a warrant or reasonable suspicion. 
See RCW 10.79.060 et seq. 
In April 1998, the SCC moved from Monroe, Washington, onto McNeil 
Island, within the McNeil Island Correctional Center (“MICC”) complex. ER 136. 
At this time, the SCC formulated an agreement with the DOC, whereby DOC 
would transport SCC residents off-island. Id. Under certain circumstances, 
residents are allowed supervised off-island visits. RCW 71.09.210 (permitting 
supervised off-island trips for funeral or bedside visit of immediate family-member 
                                           
3
 Service was not perfected on Henry Richards, the former Superintendent of SCC.  
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who is seriously ill, or for necessary medical or dental care). 
Pursuant to its agreement with SCC officials, the DOC uses the same 
invasive strip search procedures and harsh restraint techniques prescribed for 
convicted prisoners on SCC residents. ER 104 ¶ 6. The DOC Policy used for 
transporting SCC residents is classified as applicable to “Prisons.” ER 128. The 
policy statement says that it provides guidance for transporting “offenders.” ER 
129. In fact, the term offender
4
 or variations thereof are used sixty times in the 
short seven page document. ER 128-34. 
The DOC has no distinct policy for transporting individuals who are civilly 
committed. ER 124–25 ¶ 2-3. Neither DSHS nor DOC have modified the strip 
search or restraint policies to tailor them to civilly committed residents or to 
                                           
4
 The Revised Code of Washington provides the following definition: 
 
(34) “Offender” means a person who has committed a felony established by 
state law and is eighteen years of age or older or is less than eighteen years 
of age but whose case is under superior court jurisdiction under RCW 
13.04.030 or has been transferred by the appropriate juvenile court to a 
criminal court pursuant to RCW 13.40.110. In addition, for the purpose of 
community custody requirements under this chapter, “offender” also means 
a misdemeanant or gross misdemeanant probationer ordered by a superior 
court to probation pursuant to RCW 9.92.060, 9.95.204, or 9.95.210 and 
supervised by the department pursuant to RCW 9.94A.501 and 9.94A.5011. 
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determine security needs on an individualized basis. Id; ER 104. DOC correctional 
officers assigned to strip searching, restraining, and supervising SCC residents for 
transport receive no special instruction or training to handle SCC residents. ER 104 
¶ 4. Instead, DOC staff need only be qualified and trained to transport criminally 
convicted offenders under DOC supervision. ER 125 ¶ 3.  
As described by Mr. Hoisington and other SCC residents, the practices of 
the DOC transportation officers are painful and degrading. Handcuffs are 
sometimes applied so tightly that they cause loss of feeling in the hands. ER 110 ¶ 
18. The officers chain residents to hospital beds and put leg irons on someone who 
must walk on crutches. ER 121 ¶ 6. Escorting officers insist on standing guard 
inside the operating room during surgery on the basis of DOC “policy,” rather than 
observing the doctor’s wishes and waiting outside. ER 121 ¶ 5. Officers have 
undermined physical therapy after major surgery by insisting on leg irons. ER 121 
¶ 7. Rather than take notice and temper these punitive conditions, the SCC 
defendants permit the DOC to use their standard policies that are designed for 
punishing criminals. ER 251 ¶ 5.3. Defendants have made no effort to mitigate the 
harsh effects of the DOC policy by seeking or providing different treatment for 
SCC residents or individualized determinations based on assessed security risks. 
ER 124–25 ¶ 2-3; ER 104. 
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However, DOC policy permits an alternative to a strip and visual cavity 
search in certain circumstances. ER 133. If there is no secure area present for a 
strip search, then two thorough pat searches will be conducted instead. Id. In 
addition, strip searches are not conducted during the course of off-island 
transportation if prohibited by court order. ER 72, 104. An example of such a court 
order granted to an SCC resident who was represented by counsel states:  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Herzog be transported without 
a strip and/or cavity search from the Department of Corrections, Department 
of Social and Health Services, and/or the King County Correctional Facility 
absent reasonable suspicion of contraband. 
 
Order of Transportation at 2, In re the Detention of Herzog, No. 00-2-15307-4 
SEA (King County Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2001). Addendum at 82-85. 
Further, DOC policies exempt certain convicted criminals from the full 
restraint policy. ER 131 ¶¶ III.A.2., .3.a. The policy does not require restraints for 
minimum security offenders transferred to a more restrictive facility without a loss 
of custody, i.e. for medical reasons, law library visits. ER 131 ¶ A.3.a. Neither 
DOC nor SCC make any individualized assessment of risk to determine whether to 
apply these restraints. ER 104 ¶ 4. This failure to make an individualized 
determination violates the statutory procedures for resident escorted leave that 
require the DSHS superintendent, or designee, to “determine the use and type of 
restraints necessary for each escorted leave on an individual basis.” WAC 388-
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880-110 (emphasis added). 
C. Mr. Hoisington Is Subjected to Two Strip and Visual Body Cavity 
Searches and Is Shackled in Full Restraints Each Time He Travels 
Off-Island to Receive Necessary Medical Care. 
 
 Between 2005 and 2009, Mr. Hoisington has had eight escorted leaves off-
island to receive necessary medical care. ER 73. Pursuant to SCC policy and the 
agreement between DSHS and DOC, SCC and DOC staff have subjected 
Hoisington to at least 16 strip and visual body cavity searches during eight off-
island medical visits between 2005 and 2009. See ER 73; ER 109–10 ¶¶ 8, 17. 
DOC officers conducted the escorts in the following manner: under watch of two 
DOC correctional officers, Hoisington must remove all his clothes, lift his genitals, 
bend over and spread his buttocks. ER 252 ¶ 5.7. Once the search is finished, he 
must put on a pair of blue coveralls provided by DOC officers. ER 252 ¶ 6.6. DOC 
correctional officers then place Mr. Hoisington in leg irons and waist restraints to 
which his handcuffs are attached. ER 253 ¶ 6.7. The DOC guards then place him in 
a transport van along with two DOC correctional officers and one SCC officer. ER 
109. These shackles are so restrictive that Hoisington cannot move his hands more 
than three inches. ER 56. The shackles are so tight that they cause bruising on Mr. 
Hoisington’s wrists and ankles, and leave him with no feeling in his hands. ER 110 
¶ 18. On one occasion, he remained shackled for nearly seven hours. ER 112. 
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At the ferry dock, the leg irons are removed, and Mr. Hoisington is placed 
onto a ferry in an isolated area reserved for SCC residents. ER 109 ¶ 12. After the 
ferry ride, the DOC correctional officers replace his leg irons. ER 109 ¶ 13. Two 
DOC guards stay beside him during this entire off-island trip, and never leave his 
side, accompanying him into the doctor’s office for every procedure. ER 110 ¶ 16. 
When Mr. Hoisington asked why extensive restraints were necessary, he was told 
the measures were in place because it was “DOC Policy.” ER 110 ¶ 20.  
  Mr. Hoisington remains in belly chains and leg irons until he is returned to 
the SCC and the DOC officers release him to the SCC staff, where he is again 
forced to strip, lift his genitals, and spread his buttocks to be examined, this time 
by SCC staff. ER 254 ¶ 6.20. When Mr. Hoisington has asked SCC staff about the 
necessity of strip searches, he was told that it was SCC policy to strip search all 
residents coming into and leaving the SCC. ER 254 ¶ 6.22. 
Although these searches are supposed to be conducted in a manner that gives 
the residents as much privacy as possible, the door to the search room is always 
open and as many as 6 staff persons have been present while he is forced to stand 
naked and expose his body cavities for inspection. ER 110 ¶ 22. Mr. Hoisington 
has described the strip and visual body cavity searches to be humiliating and 
degrading. ER 110 ¶¶ 21, 23. Though he has been subjected to strip and visual 
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body cavity searches numerous times, he has never gotten used to it. ER 110 ¶ 21. 
 Despite the full shackling and constant supervision by two DOC officers, 
Defendants assert that the outgoing strip search is necessary to protect DOC 
officers and others who may come into contact with a particular resident. ER 136 ¶ 
4. Similarly, despite full restraints and continuous supervision of the residents 
during transport, Defendants claim that the return strip search is necessary to 
prevent residents form smuggling contraband into the facility. ER 137 ¶ 11. 
However, no contraband has yet been discovered during the course of any of these 
searches. ER 12. In fact, the only evidence Defendants offered referencing the 
origin of contraband within the SCC suggested that SCC staff members and 
visitors, rather than residents, were responsible for smuggling in contraband. ER 
190 n.3 (referring to and providing links to three newspaper articles).
 
SCC admits 
that during his time at SCC, Mr. Hoisington has not assaulted or attempted to 
assault anyone, attempted to escape, and has not attempted to transport contraband. 
ER 75–76 ¶¶ 4–7; ER 106–07 ¶¶ 4–7.  
D. The Proceedings Below. 
Faced with the impossible choice of forgoing medical care or undergoing 
degrading, humiliating, and painful treatment to receive medical care unavailable 
in the SCC, Mr. Hoisington filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
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against the state officials responsible for the operation of the SCC and the 
transportation of SCC residents. ER 245-56. Mr. Hoisington asserts in his 
complaint that the unreasonable and unnecessary strip search policy violates his 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy and his Fourteenth Amendment due process 
right to adequate care and individualized treatment as a civil detainee, ER 251 ¶ 
5.1, and that the punitive DOC policies violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
adequate treatment. ER 251 ¶ 5.4–5.6. 
Despite Mr. Hoisington’s request for production of the DOC and SCC strip 
search policies, the Defendants have withheld the policies, citing security and 
contraband concerns. ER 74 ¶¶ 1–2. The magistrate judge was also unable to 
review the policies. ER 7 (“If there is a written policy governing the manner in 
which either or both of the strip searches are to be performed, it was not 
provided.”).  
The magistrate judge examined the blanket strip search policy against Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness, and the DOC’s involvement against the Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process rights. ER 9. The magistrate judge did not 
address whether the strip and visual body cavity searches, harsh restraints, and 
other harsh treatment identical to those used on prisoners violated Mr. 
Hoisington’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. ER 9-19. Mr. Hoisington’s objections 
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to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation included assertions that the 
magistrate did not sufficiently address the Defendants’ failure to exercise 
professional judgment required under the Fourteenth Amendment, especially with 
regard to the effect of routine strip searches on the treatment environment, made all 
the worse because the SCC had ready alternatives in the form of a walk-through 
metal detector and a full body X-ray machine. ER 33, 58. In fact, SCC policies 
require residents to undergo a body scan and metal detector after each contact visit 
and a metal detector scan before a contact visit. See Washington Department of 
Social and Health Service Center, Special Commitment Center Personal Visiting 
Policy 220, at 7, XII(A), 1992, available at 
http://dshs.wa.gov/pdf/SCC/Manuals/p220.pdf) (last visited May 3, 2012). Visitors 
to SCC can also be subject to metal detector screenings, body scan searches, canine 
searches, hands-on inspection of shoes, clothing and other items, and pat/frisk 
searches. See id. at 7, XII(C)(1)-(2). 
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Fourth 
Amendment claim against strip searches and on the Fourteenth Amendment claim 
against DOC involvement in off-island transport. ER 2. The district court in its 
order did not address Mr. Hoisington’s broader Fourteenth Amendment claims. Cf. 
ER 1-2. Mr. Hoisington appeals the district court’s summary judgment order. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order for Washington’s sex offender commitment system to not run afoul 
of the ex post facto or double jeopardy clauses, the commitment must be civil in 
nature and non-punitive. Though commitment itself may be constitutional, 
conditions of confinement may be challenged as being unconstitutional or in 
violation of state statutory requirements. Mr. Hoisington’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 
challenges certain conditions of his civil confinement as violating his Fourteenth 
and Fourth Amendment rights. 
 The district court erred when it granted summary judgment and dismissed 
the case without addressing all of Mr. Hoisington’s Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
Defendant’s policies mandating strip and visual body cavity searches, full 
restraints, and other treatment incident to off-island transport created 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of Hoisington’s Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights. 
The district court erred when it concluded that the DOC’s policies and 
participation in off-island transport did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Civil commitment must be non-punitive, and “[p]ersons who have been 
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions 
of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to 
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punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982). However, those 
responsible for the transportation policies did not exercise their professional 
judgment to develop an appropriate treatment environment—instead they simply 
adopted wholesale DOC’s punitive policies and techniques. 
The district court also erred by concluding that the strip searches were 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The district court failed to acknowledge 
the reasonable alternatives available to SCC administrators that address their 
security concerns without subjecting residents to “one of the most grievous 
offenses against personal dignity and common decency.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 576–77 (1979). The district court was presented with ready alternatives to 
strip searches: a body-scanning x-ray machine already in use at the SCC, and pat-
down searches used in other scenarios, either of which would be preferable to 
routine strip searches and come at de minimis cost. ER 58. Instead, the court found 
the current strip search policy to be reasonable despite Defendants’ failure to 
present anything more than conclusory allegations that the strip search policy 
shares a “valid, rational connection” with legitimate security concerns. Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (internal quotation omitted). 
On remand, Mr. Hoisington is entitled to proceed on his claims to seek 
prospective relief and monetary damages to remedy these constitutional violations. 
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Because of the complexity and weightiness of his claims, counsel should be 
appointed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Buono v. Norton, 
371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004). This Court will not affirm a grant of summary 
judgment if there is any genuine issue of material fact, or if the district court 
misapplied the substantive law. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 
(9th Cir. 2007). Evidence is to be viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.” Sluimer v. 
Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Mr. 
Hoisington’s Claims that Defendants Imposed Unconstitutional 
Conditions of Confinement, Violating His Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Rights. 
A. Conditions of Civil Confinement Are Appropriately Tested Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The state cannot simultaneously maintain a civil commitment system that is 
formally non-punitive and be immune from liability for unconstitutional conditions 
of confinement. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). In that 
case, this Court stated:  
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The state cannot have it both ways. If the confinement of a sexually violent 
predator is civil for the purposes of evaluation under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, that confinement is civil for the purposes of determining the rights to 
which the detainee is entitled while confined. Civil status means civil status, 
with all the Fourteenth Amendment rights that accompany it. 
 
Id. (discussing California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act). 
Thus, in order for the indefinite civil detention of sex offenders to be 
constitutional, their confinement must not be punitive. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 368–69 (1997). Individuals who have not been charged or convicted of a 
crime may not be treated the same as criminal detainees. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982). Instead, noncriminal detainees “are entitled to more 
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Id. See also Sharp v. Weston, 
233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322). 
Washington’s commitment statute for sex offenders who have completed or 
about to complete their incarceration sentences has been determined to be civil in 
nature, designed to incapacitate and treat, and therefore is not an ex post facto law 
and does not violate the double jeopardy clause. In re Detention of Young, 857 
P.2d 989, 996-1000 (Wash. 1993) (superseded in part by statute on other grounds); 
cf. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262-65 (2001) (rejecting “as-applied” challenge 
to validity of sex offender commitment statute that Washington Supreme Court had 
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previously upheld as civil in nature) (citing In re Detention of Young, 857 P.2d at 
996-1000); In re Detention of Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 774 (Wash. 1999) (same). 
The Court made clear that while unconstitutional conditions of confinement 
will not invalidate an otherwise constitutionally valid civil commitment statute, 
courts “remain competent to adjudicate and remedy challenges to civil 
confinement schemes arising under the Federal Constitution.” Seling, 531 U.S. at 
265; cf. In re Detention of Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 812 (Wash. 1999) (remedy for 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement for civil detainee is not release but 
rather injunctive relief and/or damages award). 
This Court has made clear that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides residents committed under Washington’s civil commitment 
statute have the right to enjoy a non-punitive environment, adequate care, and 
individualized treatment. See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 
2000) (upholding injunctive order remedying violations of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d at 931 (“‘[T]he 
more protective fourteenth amendment standard applies to conditions of 
confinement when detainees . . . have not been convicted’ of a crime.”) (quoting 
Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
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Mr. Hoisington seeks relief in this case for the violation of this due process 
principle. 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment and 
Dismissing the Case Without Addressing All of Mr. Hoisington’s 
Fourteenth Amendment Claims. 
Failure to address all of Mr. Hoisington’s Fourteenth Amendment claims 
constitutes error. See Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 354 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(finding reversible error where the district court’s summary order only considered 
a pro se plaintiff’s First Amendment claim but failed to address his Fourteenth 
Amendment claim). In Frost, a pro se prisoner litigant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1983 and 1985 for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. 
at 352. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court, without 
addressing his Fourteenth Amendment claim, found that Frost’s First Amendment 
rights had not been violated, that the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Id. at 353. 
In its de novo review of the grant of summary judgment, this Court noted 
that it must construe Frost’s claims liberally because of his pro se prisoner status. 
Id. at 352 (citing Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that a pro se prisoner litigant’s pleadings must be construed liberally on a 
motion for summary judgment)). This Court found that the district court erred by 
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not considering Frost’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, and in light of unrebutted 
evidence regarding the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, this Court 
reversed, and on remand directed the district court to “consider whether the 
Defendants’ actions satisfied the minimum procedural safeguards required by the 
Due Process Clause.” Frost, 197 F.3d at 354. 
A similar error occurred in the court below. The district court adopted the 
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, which limited its consideration to two 
issues: “(1) whether SCC’s blanket strip search policy violates Mr. Hoisington’s 
Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) whether being placed under the control of DOC 
officers during off-island transports violates Mr. Hoisington’s Fourteenth 
Amendment right to non-punitive conditions of confinement.” ER 9. However, Mr. 
Hoisington also claimed that the SCC blanket strip search policy violated his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and more broadly, that the defendants’ blanket strip 
and visual body cavity search, their blanket restraint policy, and treatment incident 
to transportation off-island violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. ER 251-52, 254-55. Perhaps inartfully expressed,
5
 his complaint 
                                           
5
 Though Mr. Hoisington is not a prisoner, the liberal construction rules that apply 
to pro se prisoner litigant complaints should apply to an involuntarily civilly 
committed pro se litigant. In the seminal case establishing the general principle that 
pro se prisoner complaints should be liberally construed, the Court held that 
“[w]hatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal 
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nevertheless makes clear that the strip and visual body cavity searches, use of full 
restraints, and harsh treatment during transport are being challenged under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The court’s failure to discuss the policies 
regarding searches, restraints, and treatment during transport as challenges to 
conditions of confinement under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause is 
error. 
As the next section demonstrates, consideration of his claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that this error requires reversal of the 
summary judgment grant. 
C. Defendants’ Policies Mandating Strip and Visual Body Cavity 
Searches, Full Restraints, and Other Treatment Incident to Off-
Island Transport Create Unconstitutional Conditions of 
Confinement, Violating Mr. Hoisington’s Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Rights. 
As established above in Part I.A., supra at 17 - 19, conditions of 
confinement for those civilly detained are appropriately tested under the 
                                                                                                                                        
administration of prisons, allegations such as those asserted by the petitioner, 
however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer 
supporting evidence.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (applying liberal 
construction to pro se pleadings in the face of a motion to dismiss). This Court has 
extended the reasoning in Haines to apply the liberal construction rule to pro se 
prisoner complaints in the summary judgment context. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 
1235; Frost, 197 F.3d at 352. Because of the similar situation that civilly 
committed residents find themselves in – they are confined and typically have 
limited access to legal and other resources – the liberal construction rules should be 
applied to civilly committed persons who appear pro se. 
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 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) 
(involuntarily committed person retains Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest); 
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (conditions of civil confinement 
tested under the more protective Fourteenth Amendment). Policies establishing 
conditions of confinement must be reasonably related to the detention facility’s 
legitimate objectives. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). These policies 
must reflect the proper exercise of professional judgment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S., 307, 323 (1982). Further, policies that subject a civilly committed 
resident to conditions identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than those under 
which a pretrial criminal detainee are held are deemed presumptively punitive. Cf. 
Jones, 393 F.3d at 934 (discussing rights of individual confined awaiting 
adjudication under civil commitment process). 
                                           
6
 Conditions of confinement for convicted criminals are generally governed by the 
Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) 
(convicted criminals may be held under punitive conditions because they have 
been convicted of a crime). Though civil detainees are sometimes treated under the 
same test as pretrial detainees, we argue in Part II.A., infra at 33, that civil 
detainees ought to be treated differently than pretrial detainees under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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1. The Policies Mandating Strip and Visual Body Cavity Searches 
and Full Restraints Are Not Reasonably Related to Legitimate 
Civil Commitment Objectives in Light of Readily Available 
Alternatives and Instead Reflect an Exaggerated Response to the 
State’s Security Concerns. 
This Court has long recognized that “[t]he feelings of humiliation and 
degradation with forcibly exposing one’s nude body to strangers for visual 
inspection is beyond dispute.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439 
(9th Cir. 1989). Visual body cavity searches “represent one of the most grievous 
offenses against personal dignity and common decency.” Bell, 411 U.S. at 576-77. 
Exposing one's nude body to strangers for visual inspection by force undeniably 
causes feelings of humiliation and degradation. See Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F2d 
614, 617 (9th Cir 1984) (per curiam) (overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-
Durgin v. de la Vina 199 F3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir 1999) (en banc); Way v. County 
of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The feelings of humiliation and 
degradation associated with forcibly exposing one's nude body to strangers for 
visual inspection is beyond dispute.”). Thus, a policy requiring strip searches 
should be implemented only when the need for such a search is particularly great. 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 576-577. 
In the criminal context, in order for a confinement policy or regulation to be 
upheld, the state must demonstrate that the policy is “reasonably related to a 
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legitimate penological interest.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
7
 The 
Turner reasonableness standard, in the civil commitment context, requires that 
policies and regulations that burden fundamental rights be reasonably related to 
legitimate civil commitment objectives. Cf. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22 (1982) 
(emphasizing more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement required 
for noncriminal detainees than criminals”); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d at 934 
(same). The relevant Turner factors, modified to reflect the civil confinement 
context, are as follows: 
(a) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the 
regulation and a legitimate and neutral governmental interest put 
forward to justify it . . . ;  
. . . 
(c) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the asserted 
right will have an impact on . . . [civil commitment] staff, on . . . 
[residents’] liberty, and on the allocation of limited . . . [civil 
commitment facility] resources, which impact, if substantial, will 
require particular deference to . . . [civil commitment facility] 
officials; and  
                                           
7
 While this Court has applied Turner to analyze criminal detainees Fourth 
Amendment claims, we address it in the case that this Court find that the rules 
articulated in Turner apply to civil detainees. As the District Court noted, “the 
holding in [Bull v. City of County of San Francisco, 494 F.3d 964 (9
th 
Cir. 2010)] 
Bull is narrowly applied ‘only to detainees classified to enter the general 
corrections facility facility population.” 971. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
not held that the Fourth Amendment's application to jails and prisons is subject to 
the more deferential analysis of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), which 
applies “only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with proper incarceration.’ ” Johnson 
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 
126, 131 (2003)) (emphasis in original). 
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(d) whether the regulation represents an “exaggerated response” to . . . 
[civil commitment facility] concerns, the existence of a ready 
alternative that fully accommodates the . . . [residents’] rights at de 
minimis costs to valid . . . [civil commitment] interests being evidence 
of unreasonableness. 
 
Id. at 89-91 (modifications added).
8
 Although prison officials are accorded 
deference in fashioning regulations, to satisfy the factors laid out in Turner, 
prison officials must provide something more than “mere assertions of 
unfulfilled security objectives.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 564-65 (9th 
Cir. 1997); see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,414 (1989) (review 
of prison rules is not “toothless” analysis that merely requires the 
government to articulate some rational for a rule). The Court has held that 
“deference must be given to the officials in charge of the jail unless there is 
‘substantial evidence’ demonstrating their response to the situation is 
exaggerated.” Florence 10-945, 2012 WL 1069092 at 8 (citing Block v. 
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1984). Here, substantial evidence exists 
that the defendants’ policies are exaggerated responses. 
                                           
8
 As discussed in the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, the omitted 
Turner factor, “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that 
remain open to prison inmates,” is less relevant here. ER 15 n.4 (citations omitted). 
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 With regard to the first factor, an invasive strip and visual body cavity 
search is likely to reveal the existence of weapons and other contraband, the stated 
reason for the search. ER 136 ¶ 4.  
With regard to the second factor, ready alternatives exist to achieve the SCC 
and DOC’s objectives. First, the existing DOC policy allows for two thorough pat 
searches in lieu of a strip search in “areas without a secured area for a strip search.” 
ER 133. Second, a full body x-ray scanner and a metal detector, already mandated 
by SCC policy for contact visits,
9
 can achieve SCC and DOC’s security objectives. 
The magistrate judge noted that “[d]efendants did not specifically address the 
impact on SCC resources if the strip search policy were eliminated.” ER 16. 
Accommodating Hoisington’s right to be free from humiliating and degrading strip 
and visual body cavity searches in order to receive necessary medical care comes 
at minimal cost to the defendants. 
Finally, the existence of these ready alternatives which do not require 
significant additional resources demonstrates that this is an exaggerated response. 
A policy that represents an exaggerated response to security concerns is an 
                                           
9
 See Washington Department of Social and Health Service Center, Special 
Commitment Center Personal Visiting Policy 220, at 7, XII(A), 1992, available at 
http://dshs.wa.gov/pdf/SCC/Manuals/p220.pdf) (last visited May 3, 2012). 
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unnecessary burden on fundamental rights. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 87; Florence, 
10-945, 2012 WL 1069092 at *8. 
The district court misapplied the Turner test by not considering the existence 
of ready alternatives that would achieve defendants’ security objectives at minimal 
cost while saving Mr. Hoisington from unnecessary, degrading procedures. 
Further, the existence and efficacy of these ready alternatives demonstrate that the 
blanket strip and visual body cavity search is an exaggerated response and 
therefore unreasonable. It was improper for the district court to give deference to 
SCC and DOC officials under these circumstances. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 87 
2. The Adoption of Policies Mandating Strip and Visual Body Cavity 
Searches Is Punitive and Violates the Youngberg Professional-
Judgment Standard. 
This Court has found that when a civil detainee “is confined in conditions 
identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than, those in which his criminal 
counterparts are held, we presume that the detainee is being subjected to 
‘punishment.’” Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (citing Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172-73). In 
1983, Washington state forbid strip and cavity searches of pretrial detainees 
booked into holding, detention, or local correctional facilities absent a warrant or 
reasonable suspicion. See RCW 10.79.060 et seq. SCC residents such as Mr. 
Hoisington are treated worse than pretrial detainees and instead are treated like 
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prisoners, thus raising the presumption that strip and visual cavity searches are 
punitive. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932.
10
  
Youngberg established that decisions by professionals, when balancing the 
relevant state interests against the liberty interests of the involuntarily committed, 
are “presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the 
professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not 
base the decision on such a judgment.” 457 U.S. at 323. Where more than one 
professional acceptable choice exists, the court does not get to choose among them. 
Id. at 321. 
However, there is a constitutional limit to the deference afforded to officials’ 
judgment. “The principle that courts must provide wide latitude to prison policies 
needed to maintain institutional order and security necessarily presupposes that the 
administrators have crafted those policies with careful deliberation.” Kennedy v. 
Los Angeles Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702, 713 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added and 
                                           
10
 In the Eighth Circuit, rights and treatment of civil committees are analogized to 
those of pretrial detainees. See Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 
2009). If this Court adopted this approach, the presumption that strip searching 
civil committees is punishment would be even stronger because of the protections 
afforded to pretrial detainees in Washington state. 
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internal citation omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Act Up!/Portland v. 
Bagley, 971 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1992)). As this Court stated: 
Prison authorities cannot rely on general or conclusory 
assertions to support their policies. Rather, they must first identify the 
specific penological interests involved and then demonstrate both that 
those specific interests are the actual bases for their policies and that 
the policies are reasonably related to the furtherance of the identified 
interests. An evidentiary showing is required as to each point. 
 
Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 1990). No lesser standard could 
apply in the context of non-criminal detainees. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22. 
Although noncriminal detainees are entitled to more considerate treatment 
than criminals, the defendants have simply adopted wholesale the punitive DOC 
transportation policies rather than formulating non-punitive security policies 
appropriate for the civil commitment environment. Courts in this circuit have 
found that adopting blanket transportation restraint policies that apply to all 
inmates, regardless of classification including civil detainees, constituted a failure 
to exercise the required Youngberg professional judgment “in the absence of any 
evidence that SVPs pose the same security risks as penal inmates.” Noonkester v. 
Tehama Cty. Sheriff, 2011 WL 2946360 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Sumahit v. Parker 
2009 WL 2879903 at *10-11 (E.D. Cal.), report and recommendation adopted by 
2009 WL 4507723 (E.D. Cal.) (holding same). 
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Further, this Court has found that “a restriction is punitive where it 
is . . . employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished [with] alternative 
and less harsh methods” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As detailed in our discussion of 
the Turner factors in the previous section, less harsh methods are available; yet the 
defendants have made no effort to develop less restrictive policies with regard to 
off-island transport. 
Instead, they imposed a policy that mandated strip and visual body cavity 
searches for off-island transport, despite the fact that the district court, in Turay v. 
Richards, concluded that routine strip searches were destructive of the treatment 
environment at SCC, noting that the clinical director of the SCC called the strip 
searches “an abomination.” Addendum at 43. The remedial order enjoining routine 
strip and visual body cavity searches following contact visits district court was 
upheld by this Court. Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000). Despite 
having developed alternative, less intrusive search procedures following contact 
visits discussed above,
11
 the SCC has failed to develop less intrusive transport 
policies or to adequately justify them. While it is possible for presumptively 
                                           
11
 See Washington Department of Social and Health Service Center, Special 
Commitment Center Personal Visiting Policy 220, at 7, XII(A), 1992, available at 
http://dshs.wa.gov/pdf/SCC/Manuals/p220.pdf) (last visited May 3, 2012). 
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punitive policies to be justified by a professional judgment informed by specific 
evidence,
12
 appellees have offered no such judgment here. The Defendants merely 
recite conclusory assertions that the punitive policies enhance safety, with no 
consideration to adverse clinical consequences.  
II. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Mr. 
Hoisington’s Claim that the Blanket Strip and Visual Body Cavity 
Policy Violated His Fourth Amendment Rights. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, visual body cavity searches of persons held 
in civil custody must be grounded in reasonable suspicion that the resident targeted 
possesses contraband.  The defendants’ 16 humiliating and degrading visual body 
cavity searches of Mr. Hoisington before and after transportation for medical visits 
at SCC were lawful under the Fourth Amendment because the defendants did not 
have any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hoisington had contraband, and rather 
conducted these searches pursuant to blanket correctional policy. Even if this 
Court finds that reasonable suspicion is not required for civil detainees, the 
Magistrate erred in granting summary judgment to defendants and finding the 
search reasonable, because it failed to consider the scope of the intrusion of the 
search, easily available and less intrusive alternatives to visual cavity strip 
                                           
12
 See Dudgeon v. Cunningham, 2011 WL 4001099 at *10-11 (W.D. Wash. 2011) 
(noting that restriction regarding photos was more restrictive than for prisoners but 
accepting treatment-based professional opinion), report and recommendation 
adopted by 2011 WL 4007326 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
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searches, and because the blanket DOC strip search policy used by defendants was 
an arbitrary and exaggerated response to defendants safety concerns. 
A. The Fourth Amendment Requires Individualized Suspicion Before a 
Civilly Committed Resident May Be Subjected to a Strip and Visual 
Body Cavity Search. 
Civil custody of sex offenders rests on a critical distinction between 
treatment and punishment. Washington holds Hoisington in civil custody as a 
patient for the purposes of treatment and public protection and not for the purpose 
of punishment. Although Mr. Hoisington is not subject to punishment, the housing 
of sex offenders, like the housing of immigrants detained for civil immigration 
violations and involuntary committed psychiatric patients, who also are not subject 
to punishment, raises legitimate institutional safety and security concerns. The 
Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion standard is entirely consistent with these 
institutional concerns. As courts in this Circuit have consistently recognized, visual 
body cavity searches of civil detainees must be justified by individualized 
suspicion. 
1. Persons Held in Civil Custody Are Not Subject to Punishment 
 
As described in Section I.A., supra at 17, persons held in civil custody 
cannot be subjected to punishment. The Supreme Court and this Court, has made 
clear that civilly committed sex offenders cannot be subject to punishment or 
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punitive conditions of confinement, but rather can only be held for treatment. See, 
e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 
263, 265 (2001) (noting prior judicial determination that Washington's sexually 
violent predator act is “civil in nature, designed to incapacitate and to treat” and 
rejecting an “as applied” analysis to determine if a particular scheme of 
confinement is punitive). Thus, under the Fourteenth Amendment, civilly 
committed detainees cannot be subjected to conditions that amount to 
punishment.
13
 Jones, 393 F.3d at 932.   
Consistent with these Constitutional principles, Washington state law 
provides that the goal of civilly committing sex offenders in SCC is to provide 
“long-term” rehabilitation for a population that requires “different treatment 
modalities.” RCW 71.09.010. The Ninth Circuit has underscored that SCC 
facilities must provide “individualized treatment and adequate care” for residents 
who had already completed their criminal sentences.  Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 
1166 (2000); RCW 71.09.080(3).  
2. Different Constitutional Standards Apply to Persons Held in Civil 
Custody than Apply to Prisoners Charged or Convicted of a Crime 
 
                                           
13
 A person held in custody after being found not guilty by reason of insanity is 
“not a ‘prisoner’ subject to punishment.” Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 
(8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 535).  
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The district court erred by applying the wrong constitutional standards in 
analyzing Mr. Hoisington’s claims. The court misapplied Fourth Amendment 
standards governing the rights of convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees, 
instead of looking to the relevant legal principles governing conditions for civil 
detainees, like Mr. Hoisington, who have not been charged with a crime. ER 9-10.  
Different constitutional standards apply to sex offenders held in civil 
custody than to individuals detained incarcerated in the criminal justice system. 
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 (finding that an essential component of civil 
confinement of sex offenders is that they are “segregated from the general prison 
population and afforded the same status as others who have been civilly 
committed”); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) (“Persons who 
have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and 
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish.”); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). Indeed, 
this Court and courts in this Circuit have made clear that an individual civilly 
committed is entitled to greater constitutional protections in their conditions of 
confinement as those afforded to an individual accused but not convicted of a 
crime and criminally convicted prisoners. See, e.g., Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (holding 
that a civil detainee is entitled to “more considerate treatment” and less restrictive 
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conditions than pre-trial detainees and convicted criminals); Bacon v. Kolender, 
Civ. No. 05-0310, 2007 WL 2669541 (S.D.Cal.2007). This Court has specifically 
recognized individuals committed to the civil custody of the SCC are “entitled to 
‘more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement ‘” than “a prison 
inmate.” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172-73(9th Cir.2000) (internal cites 
omitted) (finding that Youngberg required that individuals civilly confined at a 
commitment center receive “more considerate” treatment than inmates at the 
correctional center in which the commitment center was located).  
Accordingly, this Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment rights of 
involuntary civilly committed detainees cannot be equated with the limited rights 
of prisoners or pretrial criminal detainees. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 998 
(9th Cir. 2007), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 129 S.Ct. 2431 (2009) 
((holding that “the rights afforded prisoners set a floor for those that must be 
afforded” sexually violent predators subject to civil detention). This Court in 
Hydrick underscored that detained sex offenders “must, at a minimum, be afforded 
the rights afforded prisoners confined in a penal institution.” Id.  
Thus, courts in this Circuit have found unconstitutional strip search policies 
used for civil detainees when they have been identical to those used for individuals 
arrested or charged with a crime. See, e.g, Bacon v. Kolender, Civ. No. 05-0310, 
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2007 WL 2669541 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (denying defendant-jail officials motion for 
summary judgment on civilly committed sex offenders’  constitutional challenge to 
jail strip search policy because defendants used identical policy for civil detainees 
and pre-trial criminal detainees). See also Gomez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 882 
(9th Cir. 2005) (civilly committed immigration detainees cannot be criminally 
confined in a penal facility with a penal atmosphere). And consistent with the 
stronger Fourth Amendment protections afforded to civilly committed sex 
offenders, this Court has specifically recognized that strip searches that pass 
constitutional muster in a pre-trial context do not meet the minimal constitutional 
standards required in the civil commitment context. Compare Turay v. Richards, 
Addendum at 40, 41-43, aff’d by Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(enjoining strip searches of detainees before and after contact visits because they 
were destructive of the treatment environment at SCC) with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 558 (upholding rule requiring visual body cavity searches of pretrial 
detainees in federal correctional facilities after contact visits); Cf. Bull v. City and 
Cty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (upholding a blanket 
policy of strip searching all pre-trial arrestees before they enter San Francisco's 
general jail population). 
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Mr. Hoisington is not incarcerated as a result of a criminal conviction, and, 
the constitutionality of his continuing custody--after completion of his criminal 
sentence--is premised on treatment and protection of public, not punishment.  Mr. 
Hoisington’s Fourth Amendment claim, like the excessive-force claim of an 
involuntarily committed state hospital patient, “does not fit neatly into an analysis 
based on status as an arrestee, a pre-trial detainee, or a prisoner.” Andrews v. Neer, 
253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001). As search, he “must, at a minimum, be 




3. Visual Body Cavity Searches of Persons in Custody Under a Civil 
Commitment Requires Individualized Suspicion 
 
The district court further erred by failing to recognize that visual body cavity 
searches of civilly committed sex offenders, as well as all other persons in civil 
custody, must be justified by individualized reasonable  suspicion. Instead, the 
Court erroneously analyzed Hoisington’s claims under the “established case law as 
it pertains to pretrial detainees” in the criminal justice system. ER 9. By doing so, 
it ignored the clear rules in this Circuit that require civilly detainees are entitled to 
                                           
14
 As described in Section I,B., under the  SCC strip search policy is also 
unconstitutional because Washington state law has more protective strip search 
policies for criminal and pre-trial detainees, because it prohibits suspicionless strip 
searches for such detainees. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.79.130(1)(a), (1)(b) (requiring 
“reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause” before strip searches). 
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greater constitutional protections than individuals charged with crimes, including 
individualized suspicion prior to strip searches. Absent any reasonable suspicion 
that Mr. Hoisington possessed contraband, the SCC and DOC policy violated Mr. 
Hoisington's Fourth Amendment right to be secure from an unreasonable search. 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons . . .  against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. 
IV. Privacy is the primary interest underlying the fourth amendment. Katz v. U.S., 
389 U.S. 347, (1967). However, “that amendment also protects persons against 
infringements of bodily integrity, Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985), and 
personal dignity, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Jordan v. 
Gardner, 986 F2d 1521, 1534 (9th Cir 1993). Strip searches, like any intrusion of a 
Fourth Amendment interest, are subject to “the Fourth Amendment's normal 
requirement of individualized suspicion.” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 
(1997). “The demand for specificity in the information upon which policy action is 
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.8 (1968). An order to strip naked 
before a government official is a dramatic intrusion upon personal privacy and 
dignity that falls within “a category of its own demanding its own specific 
suspicions.” Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 
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Thus, this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have rejected that 
requirement only “[i]n limited circumstances, where the privacy interests 
implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental 
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of 
individualized suspicion.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 
624 (1989). A strip search of a civil detainee amounts to such a significant 
intrusion on personal privacy and dignity, and the justification for that intrusion is 
so meager, that it must be justified by some form of suspicion. 
This Court has consistently held that under the Fourth Amendment, civil 
detention centers must apply a reasonable individualized suspicion standard prior 
to strip searches in a range of contexts. While the Supreme Court recently held in 
Florence that searches of pre-trial detainees do not require reasonable suspicion 
prior to booking in a general jail population,
15
 see infra, this Court and courts in 
                                           
15
 The Supreme Court has applied the traditional Fourth Amendment inquiry into 
reasonableness in almost every possible setting, including not only jails and 
prisons, but also - for example - schools, Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. 
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009), borders, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U.S. 266 (1973), and sensitive facilities such as airports, Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 
U.S. 1 (1984) (per curiam), where “the need for [particular searches] to ensure 
public safety can be particularly acute,” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 
32, 47-48 (2000). The Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine accounts for the context 
of incarceration by treating it as a central component of the reasonableness of the 
individual's expectation of privacy in that unique setting. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527; 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-60. 
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this circuit have consistently held that strip searches of civilly committed detainees 
require reasonable suspicion that an individual possesses contraband or a weapon: 
 (1) individualized suspicion is required for institutional, visual body cavity 
searches of civilly committed sex offenders, see, e.g., Meyers v. Pope, 303 Fed. 
Appx. 513, 516 (9th Cir.2008) (reversing summary judgment in suit brought by 
civilly committed sex offender against jail official defendants who engaged in 
routine strip searches without reasonable suspicion); Jones v. Blanas, No. CIV S-
00-2811, 2008 WL 5411967 (E.D.Cal. 2008) on remand from Jones v. Blanas, 393 
F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004) cert denied. (strip searches of civilly committed detainee 
found unconstitutional in absence of reasonable suspicion); Flores v. Fresno 
County Bd. of Sup'rs, 2009 WL 179775 (E.D.Cal. 2009) (refusing to dismiss 
complaint brought by civil detainee classified as a sex offender challenging strip 
searches by jail official-defendants because they were unreasonable and 
unnecessary, and degrading in nature). 
(2) individualized suspicion is required for strip searches of for individuals 
detained for civil immigration violations.  See, e.g., Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F.Supp.2d 
1103, 1116 (D.Nev. 2009) (finding a clearly established Fourth Amendment right a 
for non-admitted alien to be free from non-invasive, non-abusive strip searches 
absent requisite reasonable suspicion); Tungwarara v. United States, 400 
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F.Supp.2d 1213 (N.D.Cal. 2005) (holding that rights under the Fourth Amendment 
fall along a continuum, with United States citizens and resident aliens afforded the 
most protection,” and strip searches performed on an alien in a detention facility 
without some level of suspicion was unconstitutional); Wong v. Beebe (Wong II), 
No. 01-718-ST, 2007 WL 1170621 (D.Or. Apr. 10, 2007) (holding that non-
admitted aliens retained a Fourth Amendment right to be free from non-routine 
searches without reasonable suspicion at immigration detention centers); Flores v. 
Meese, 681 F.Supp. 665, 669 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (invalidating policy under which all 
juvenile aliens were subjected to strip searches without reasonable suspicion at an 
INS facility). Cf. Adnan v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Corrections, No. 4:02–
CV–03451, 2002 WL 32058464 (N.D.Cal. 2002) (recognizing immigration 
detainee’s claim that body cavity search was unreasonable). 
 (3) individualized suspicion is required for body cavity searches of 
individuals detained during border searches. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gonzalez-Rincon, 36 
F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir 1994) (strip searches and body-cavity searches of arriving 
aliens are “of course” non-routine, and unlike routine luggage searches and pat-
downs and require reasonable suspicion); Kirkpatrick v. City of Los Angeles, 803 
F2d 485, 489 (9th Cir 1986) (strictly applied standard of reasonable suspicion must 
be satisfied to justify a strip search at the border); Huguez v. U.S., 406 F.2d 366, 
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374 - 376 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding body cavity search at a border crossing 
unconstitutional in violation of Fourth Amendment's protections against 
unreasonable searches) (“[I]n the case of a search of body cavities, there must be a 
clear indication of the possession of narcotics or a plain suggestion of the 
smuggling, which must be ‘ver and beyond a mere suspicion”) (internal cites 
omitted); Rivas v. United States, 368 F. 2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 
386 U.S. 945 (1967) (requiring reasonable suspicion for body cavity search at 
border, and upholding search because defendant appeared under influence of 
narcotics and was a previously convicted and registered user of narcotics).
16
  
Accepting defendant’s argument that civil commitment centers may strip 
search any detainee without regard to the circumstances of individualized 
suspicion invites a sweeping intrusion upon individual privacy. Jail strip searches 
are “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, 
embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.” Mary Beth G. v. 
Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983). As this Court has held, “[t]he 
feelings of humiliation and degradation associated with forcibly exposing one's 
                                           
16
 See also Martinez v. County of San Diego, 962 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1992) (in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion that a particular prison visitor is attempting to 
smuggle drugs or other contraband, a strip search of the visitor violates the Fourth 
Amendment).  
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nude body to strangers for visual inspection is beyond dispute.” Way v. County of 
Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006).  
The Supreme Court’s holding in Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of 
County of Burlington, that pre-trial detainees may be subject to strip searches upon 
admission to the general jail population without reasonable suspicion, in a jail that 
included convicted criminals, is inapposite to this case and the law of this circuit 
requiring reasonable suspicion prior to strip searches of civil detainees. Florence, 
10-945, 2012 WL 1069092 at 11-13 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2012). First, Florence addresses 
detainees held in the criminal justice system, and this Court has held that civilly 
committed detainees must be treated better than individuals in the criminal justice 
system, including pre-trial detainees and individuals committed of a crime. See, 
e.g., Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (holding that a civil detainee is entitled to “more 
considerate treatment” and less restrictive conditions than pre-trial detainees and 
convicted criminals).  
Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning in Florence is specific to considerations 
unique to detention facilities for criminal pre-trial detainees. In holding that jails 
could apply blanket strip search policies to individuals arrested for minor crimes, 
the Court relied on concerns specific to the criminal justice system and general jail 
population, finding that “the safety of jails would be severely compromised if 
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arrestees were not searched during the intake process.” Id.  The Court reasoned that 
jails were “unsanitary and dangerous places,” and that they needed to screen 
admits was necessary to ensure no persons had gang-affiliated tattoos and that they 
did not suffer from any visible, possibly contagious health problems. Id. at 13. 
Defendants raised no similar concerns here. 
 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a blanket strip search policy was 
warranted because jails “can be even more dangerous than prison because officials 
there know so little about the people they admit at the outset.” Id. at 16. In contrast 
to the unknown risks posed by pretrial inmates, the SCC staff knows the plaintiff in 
this case who is being transported and searched; Hoisington has been confined at 
the facility on McNeil Island for over 10 years. ER 136. He has never been caught 
with contraband. ER 75, 106. Because SCC staff have a personal working 
knowledge of most of the residents housed on the Island, there is much less 
uncertainty about SCC residents than there was with the pre-trial detainees in 
Florence. Furthermore, the SCC officials’ personal knowledge of detainees 
minimizes any risk of harm – if the staff encounters the residents on a regular 
basis, they have a more informed ability to use the reasonable suspicion standard, 
rather than apply a routine blanket strip search policy. 
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The Court in Florence also based its decision on concrete evidence on the 
record that showed that “people arrested for minor offenses have tried to smuggle 
prohibited items into jails, sometimes using their rectal cavities or genitals for the 
concealment.” Id. at 14. The Court specifically pointed to evidence and concrete 
statistics demonstrating a risk that suspected criminals smuggle dangerous or 
illegal contraband from the public into jails during the intake process. It observed 
that strip searches in one County Jail in San Francisco, resulted in the discovery of 
“73 cases of illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia hidden in body cavities” including 
“handcuff keys, syringes, crack pipes, heroin, crack-cocaine, rock cocaine, and 
marijuana, a seven-inch folding knife, a double-bladed folding knife, a pair of 8-
inch scissors, a jackknife, a double-edged dagger, a nail, and glass shards. Id.  In 
contrast, SCC have never uncovered contraband during the course of any of these 
searches. ER 12. In fact, the only evidence Defendants offered referencing the 
origin of contraband within the SCC suggested that SCC staff members and 
visitors, rather than residents, were responsible for smuggling in contraband. ER 
190 n.3 (referring to and providing links to three newspaper articles).
17
 
                                           
17
 Federal agencies charged with detention of civil commitment similarly prevent 
suspicionless strip searches. The Department of Homeland Security, which is 
responsible for immigration detainees, permits strip searches “only where there is 
reasonable suspicion that contraband may be concealed on the person, or when 
there is reasonable suspicion that a good opportunity for concealment has 
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4. The District Court Erred Because Mr. Hoisington Was Strip 
Searched Without Any Evidence of Reasonable Suspicion. 
The Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding 
than the requirement of probable cause. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 341 (1985) (listing cases recognizing “the legality of searches and seizures 
based on suspicions that, although ‘reasonable,’ do not rise to the level of probable 
cause”); Hunter, 672 F.2d at 674 (noting that “the fourth amendment 
reasonableness standard allows [some] searches to be based on less than probable 
cause”). However, even under the less demanding “reasonable suspicion” standard, 
courts “usually require[] some quantum of individualized suspicion.” Skinner v. 
Ry. Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (internal quotations 
omitted). As this Court has explained, the reasonable suspicion standard in a civil 
commitment context requires officials to base strip searches on specific objective 
facts and rational inferences they are entitled to draw from those facts in light of 
their experience, specifically directed to the person who is targeted for the strip 
search. See Hunter, 672 F.2d at 674-75. 
In this case, defendants do not dispute that they had no reason to suspect that 
Hoisington was attempting to smuggle anything out of or into the SCC during his 
                                                                                                                                        
occurred.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detention Standard: Searches 
of Detainees pt. 2, § 13 (2008).  
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off-island medical visits. The multiple invasive strip searches that Mr. Hoisington 
underwent at SCC was a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment, because there 
was no ”reasonable suspicion” that he was concealing anything in his body. 
Indeed, this point appears to be disputed; the defendants subjected Mr. Hoisington 
to more than 16 visual body cavity searches pursuant to a blanket policywithout 
any individualized suspicion that Mr. Hoisington was carrying contraband. ER 73, 
109-10. To the contrary, defendants admit that during his time at SCC, Mr. 
Hoisington has not assaulted or attempted to assault anyone, attempted to escape, 
and has not attempted to transport contraband. ER 75–76, 106–07. Nonetheless, 
before and after each medical visit, defendants strip searched him merely for 
visiting his doctor. They require him to stand naked before officers, turn around, 
and lift his buttocks. ER 252 ¶ 5.7. 
Requiring reasonable suspicion standard is consistent with institutional 
security concerns. Individualized circumstances may justify the substantially 
greater intrusion of a strip search or even a body cavity search. The ordinary 
searches described above may give rise to suspicion that a civil detainee is carrying 
contraband. Also, reasonable suspicion justifying such a search may arise from the 
nature of the off-island visit (such as with non-professionals or physical access to 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 61 of 78
(61 of 166)
 
 -49-  
 
contraband), the circumstances of the visit (as when it appears that the resident hid 
contraband), or the resident's prior history of possessing contraband on SCC. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and remand for a proper analysis of 
Hoisington's claim under the correct Fourth Amendment standard. 
B. Even if Individualized Suspicion Is Not Required to Justify a Visual 
Body Cavity Search of a Civilly Committed Resident, There Are 
Genuine Issues of Material Fact Whether the Search Was Reasonable. 
Even if individualized suspicion is not required to justify defendants’ 
multiple highly intrusive visual body cavity searches prior to and following Mr. 
Hoisington’s fully supervised and restrained off-island transports, the district court 
erred in holding that this search was reasonable. ER 17. The Supreme Court in Bell 
“requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of 
personal rights that the search entails.” 441 U.S. at 559. Bell also presupposes 
consideration of less intrusive alternatives to visual body cavity searches. See id. at 
559 n.40. The district court erred in granting summary judgment that the search 
was reasonable because there are genuine issues of material fact whether there 
were less intrusive alternatives and whether defendants properly considered them. 
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1. Legal standard for assessing reasonableness of strip search policy 
requires balancing restriction of Hoisington’s constitutional rights with 
valid civil commitment interest. 
To assess whether an institutional strip search policy is reasonable under the 
Bell balancing test, courts are required to assess the scope of the particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and 
the place in which it is conducted. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. In light of the 
rehabilitative purpose of civil confinement and the varying security concerns of 
civil detention, civil detainees are entitled to greater constitutional protections than 
individuals charged with or convicted of a crime confined in jails or prisons.
18
 The 
factors courts must consider under Bell include “1) the scope of the particular 
intrusion; 2) the manner in which the search is conducted; 3) the justification for 
initiating the search; and 4) the place where the search is conducted.” Bell, 411 
U.S. at 559.  However, the Court made clear that “[c]onvicted prisoners do not 
forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement 
in prison.” Id. at 545. 
                                           
18
 See e.g. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) (“[P]ersons who 
have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and 
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish”); Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (2000) (SCC residents are 
entitled to non-punitive conditions of confinement and adequate treatment that 
would give them “a realistic opportunity to be cured or improve the mental 
condition for which they were confined.”). 
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In the pre-trial and prison context, the Ninth Circuit has required that where 
a detention facility restricts detainees constitutional rights, a court must apply the 
principles articulated in Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See Bull v. City of 
County of San Francisco, 494 F.3d 964, 971. In Turner, the Supreme Court 
observed that, “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from 
the protections of the Constitution.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. Thus, the Court 
reasoned that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, 
the prison must establish that the regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
2. The district court erred by failing to engage in a factually complete or 
reasoned analysis of the invasiveness of the strip search or the 
availability of less intrusive alternatives in evaluating Hoisington’s strip 
search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The district court erred in applying the Bell test by failing to fully consider 
the first two factors of the Bell test, or the invasion of [Hoisington’s's] personal 
rights, and “the manner in which the search is conducted, Bell, ___ and in effect 
put nothing in the Bell balance against the governmental interests in the search. As 
discussed above, this Court has long recognized that “[t]he feelings of humiliation 
and degradiation with forcibly exposing one’s nude body to strangers for visual 
inspection is beyond dispute.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439 
(9th Cir. 1989). Visual body cavity searches “represent one of the most grievous 
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offenses against personal dignity and common decency.” Bell, 411 U.S. at 576-77. 
Exposing one's nude body to strangers for visual inspection by force undeniably 
causes feelings of humiliation and degradation. See Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F2d 
614, 617 (9th Cir 1984) (per curiam) (overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-
Durgin v. de la Vina 199 F3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir 1999) (en banc)); Way v. County 
of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The feelings of humiliation and 
degradation associated with forcibly exposing one's nude body to strangers for 
visual inspection is beyond dispute.”). 
The Fourth Amendment's “overriding function” is to “protect personal 
privacy and dignity against unwar-ranted intrusion by the State.” Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The “meaning” of a strip search when 
specifically demanded by the government, as well as “the degradation its subject 
may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive into a category of its own 
demanding its own specific suspicions.” Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009). Jail strip searches are “demeaning, 
dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, 
repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.” Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723 
F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983). It is an “invasion of personal rights of the first 
magnitude.” Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 383, 395 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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The power to safeguard the privacy of one's body “safeguards human dignity as 
defined by modern society.” Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 477, 537 (2006). Individuals ordered to expose themselves can “experience 
a severe and sometimes debilitating humiliation and loss of self-esteem.” Id. 
Despite the recognition of the intrusive nature of visual body searches, the 
district court dismissed the scope of the search and manner of the search in one 
brief paragraph that omitted key details of the search and labeling it as “not 
invasive.”  ER 11. In its brief “analysis,” the court failed to acknowledge the detail 
of Hoisington’s “exposure of his nude body” for inspection when analyzing the 
intrusiveness of the search. In analyzing the first two Bell factors, the court failed 
to consider the fact that in his pre-medical visit search, Hoisington is required to 
remove all his clothes, lift his genitals, bend over and spread his buttocks in front 
of two DOC Correctional Officials. ER 11, 252. Nor did the Court acknowledge or 
analyze the search upon his return from his supervised medical visit, Hoisington is 
again forced to remove all of his clothes in a room with the door open, lift his 
genitals, and spread his buttocks to be examined. ER 254. By failing to consider 
these details and dismissing the invasiveness of the search, the magistrate judge 
and district court erred by giving due weight to these facts, and analyze them in 
light of this Court’s clear findings on the intrusiveness of visual body cavity 
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searches. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept, 901 F2d 702, 711 (9th Cir 
1989) (“the intrusiveness of a body cavity search cannot be overstated”). 
This wholesale intrusion on personal privacy and dignity is not outweighed 
by an interest in deterring and detecting the smuggling of contraband into jails. 
That is an important interest, but not one that these policies advance materially. 
3. Defendants did not carry their burden of establishing the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact whether there were less intrusive 
alternatives to visual body cavity searches that would have a de minimis 
impact on security concerns. 
Defendants did not carry their burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) to prove 
that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” whether there were any less 
intrusive alternatives to visual body cavity searches, and the Magistrate erred by 
not considering these alternatives. The strip search policies used at SCC, read in 
the light most favorable to Hoisington, the non-moving party, Sluimer v. Verity, 
Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2010), demonstrate that there were less intrusive 
alternatives to visual body cavity searches upon departure and return from the SCC 
for medical visits. To the extent that there is a reasonable prospect that SCC 
residents will-or even can- attempt to engage in smuggling, the SCC have 
numerous alternatives at their disposal to detect contraband. There are at least three 
clear, less intrusive alternatives to the strip and visual cavity search procedure that 
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were raised to the lower court which still meet the security needs of SCC, while 
protecting the interests of the residents. 
First, the DOC transport policy governing off-island transport at SCC 
authorizes less intrusive searches to strip search policy permits correctional 
officers to conduct alternative searches as an alternative to a strip and visual cavity 
searches. If there is no secure area present for a strip search, the policy requires 
that two thorough pat searches will be conducted instead. ER 133. 
Second, a full body-scanning x-ray scanner and metal detector are located in the 
SCC and could be used in lieu of the strip search to satisfy the security concerns at 
SCC. ER 58. In fact, SCC policies require residents to undergo a body scan and 
metal detector after each contact visit, and a metal detector scan before a contact 
visit.
 19
  Third, SCC also utilizes canine searches, hands-on inspection of shoes, 
clothing and other items, and pat/frisk searches for visitors prior to contact visits, 
in addition to metal detector screenings, body scan searches.
 20
 Each of these 
alternatives would be less intrusive than routine strip searches and visual body 
                                           
19
 See Washington Department of Social and Health Service Center, Special 
Commitment Center Personal Visiting Policy 220, at 7, XII(A), 1992, available at 
http://dshs.wa.gov/pdf/SCC/Manuals/p220.pdf) (last visited May 3, 2012). 
Visitors to SCC can also be subject to metal detector screenings, body scan 
searches, canine searches, hands-on inspection of shoes, clothing and other items, 
and pat/frisk searches. See Id. at 7, XII(C)(1)-(2). 
20
 Id. at 7, XII(C)(1)-(2). 
  Case: 10-35917, 05/04/2012, ID: 8166256, DktEntry: 27-1, Page 68 of 78
(68 of 166)
 
 -56-  
 
cavity inspections, and come at de minimis cost. ER 58. The Magistrate erred by 
failing to consider these ready alternatives in its granting defendant’s summary 
judgment motion.  
Because these search mechanisms are already available to and employed by 
SCC and DOC, adopting them prior to or after off-island transports would not have 
a significant impact on SCC staff or on the allocation of limited SCC resources, 
while signigificantly minimizing the deprivation of Hoisington’s liberty interests. 
These are all already options to SCC and DOC officials. Rather, these alternatives 
would promote the resident’s liberty interests, they are less costly and labor-
intensive. More likely, would likely make the transport process less burdensome 
and more efficient. Ultimately, in light of the other factors, any burden on the SCC 
facility to implement these alternatives would not substantially outweigh the 
constitutional protections they must afford the residents in their care and under 
their treatment. 
Courts in this circuit have found that similar strip-search policies applied to 
detainees contravened the Fourth Amendment because it was excessive in relation 
to government's legitimate safety interests when little effort has been made to 
mitigate the scope and intensity of the searches and less intrusive alternatives 
existed. See, e.g. Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F.Supp.2d 1233 (D. Or. 2010). 
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The Magistrate aggravated the errors of its one-sided balance of defendant’s 
interest by failing to consider whether there were any less intrusive alternatives to 
visual body cavity searches. In Bell, the Supreme Court assumed that “the 
existence of less intrusive alternatives is relevant to the determination of the 
reasonableness” of a visual body cavity search. 441 U.S. at 559 n.40. While courts 
should be conscious of judicial deference afforded to corrections officials, the 
“existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not 
reasonable, but is an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns.” See also Turner, 
428 U.S. at 90. 
III. On Remand, Appellant Is Entitled to Proceed on His Fourteenth and 
Fourth Amendment Claims to Seek Prospective Relief and Monetary 
Damages to Remedy these Constitutional Violations. 
 
A. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar prospective relief 
State sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment generally bar suits 
brought by individuals against a state without its consent or congressional 
abrogation. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Secondary Education 
Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 669-70 (1999). The Supreme Court has held that 
Congress did not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1979). Because Washington has not 
consented to suit under §1983, private parties may not sue the State. 
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State officers, however, may be enjoined to conform their future behavior to 
federal law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). “[I]n determining 
whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, 
a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint 
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized 
as prospective.’” Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 
1639 (2011) (second modification in original) (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public 
Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). 
Here, Mr. Hoisington alleges ongoing constitutional violations in the form of 
unreasonable searches and punitive transportation policies and the Defendants’ 
pleadings admit that the policies in question continue to be employed. ER 135 ¶¶ 5, 
6.
21
 The relief is properly characterized as prospective because Mr. Hoisington has 
requested for the unreasonable strip searches and punitive transportation policies to 
be permanently discontinued in the future. 
Finally, neither state sovereign immunity nor the Eleventh Amendment bar 
declaratory relief. The Ninth Circuit has “long held that the Eleventh Amendment 
                                           
21
 After the District Court proceedings, Plaintiff became aware that the DOC is no 
longer involved in the off-island transport of SCC residents. Such evidence is not 
in the record, however, and it does not mitigate Plaintiff’s request for injunctive 
relief barring the punitive DOC policies from being employed during off-island 
transport.  
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does not generally bar declaratory judgment actions against state officers.” Nat'l 
Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on 
denial of reh'g, 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002). Again the only inquiry “is whether 
the declaratory action is seeking prospective, rather than retrospective, relief.” Id. 
B. On Remand, Mr. Hoisington Is Entitled to Pursue His Claim for 
Monetary Damages Because His Rights Were Clearly Established at the 
Time of the Violation. 
 
The issue of qualified immunity was not decided because the district court 
found there was no constitutional violation. ER 22. If this Court reverses and on 
remand Mr. Hoisington establishes a constitutional violation, he will need to 
establish the violation of a clearly established right in order to be entitled to 
damages. See Saucier v. Katz 533 U.S. 194, 200-202 (2001). 
D. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to overturn the lower court’s grant 
of summary judgment to Defendants. In doing so the Court should rule that, as a 
non-criminal detainee, Mr. Hoisington has a clearly established right to be free 
from strip and visual body cavity searches that are not based on individualized 
suspicion and that the adoption of punitive DOC policies violates Mr. Hoisington’s 
clearly established right to a constitutionally adequate treatment environment. 
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Finally, because of the complexity and weightiness of his claims, Mr. Hoisington 
asks the Court to order that counsel be appointed upon remand. 
 
 
DATED: May 4, 2012 
 
RONALD PETERSON LAW 
CLINIC 
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